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Abstract 
This study examined children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about the exclusion of others in 
peer and school contexts. Participants (80 8-year-olds, 85 11-year-olds, 74 14-year-olds, and 
73 20-year-olds) were asked to judge and reason about the acceptability of exclusion from 
novel groups by children and school principals. Three contexts for exclusion between two 
groups were systematically varied: unequal economic status, geographical location, or a 
control (no reason provided for group differences). Regardless of condition, participants 
believed that exclusion was less acceptable in peer than school contexts, and when children 
excluded rather than principals. Participants also used more moral and less social 
conventional reasoning for peer than school contexts.  In terms of condition, whereas 8-year-
olds rated exclusion based on unequal economic status as less acceptable than when based on 
geographical location or no reason when enacted by a principal, 14-year-olds rated the 
unequal economic condition as more acceptable than the other two contexts. Eleven- and 20-
year-olds did not distinguish economic status differences. The findings suggest that children 
and adolescents are sensitive to context and take multiple variables into account, including 
the type of group difference (socioeconomic status or other reasons), authority status of the 
perpetrator of exclusion, and setting (school or peer).  Patterns may have differed from past 
research because of the socio-cultural context in which exclusion was embedded and the 
contexts of group differences. 
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Young People’s Reasoning about Exclusion in Novel Groups 
Children are often excluded from peer and institutional contexts based on their social 
group membership. Children reason differently about social exclusion based on the 
situational specificity of the exclusion, such as the social groups involved (e.g., gender versus 
ethnicity, Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Malti, Killen, & Gasser, 2012), the 
perpetrator of exclusion (teachers versus peers, Møller & Tenenbaum, 2011), and the social 
context in which it occurs (school versus peer groups, Tenenbaum, Leman, & Aznar, 2017). 
Children often justify gender exclusion, for example, using conventional reasons such as 
traditions (e.g., girls have never played with trucks before) or stereotypes (e.g., girls are not 
good at math so it’s okay not to let her in the math club).  Justifications for racial exclusion 
are less likely to be about conventions and more often based on stereotypic attributes of 
indiviudals based on race. Explanations for rejecting exclusion are often in the form of the 
unfairness or psychological harm to the excluded individual. However, individuals also reject 
social exclusion for conventional reasons (e.g., It’s wrong to exclude the boy from soccer 
because they will win if he’s on the team.) Determining how youth evaluate different types of 
exclusion is necessary for understanding which factors contribute to social exclusion that 
generate negative outcomes for children and adolescents.  
Recently, a series of studies by Elenbaas and her colleauges have investigated 
children’s perceptions of exclusion from valuable opportunities based on socioeconomic 
conditions, varying the wealth status (high, low) of the target groups (Elenbass & Killen, 
2018).  Specifically, in one study the researchers examined whether children ages 8- 14 years 
expected high-wealth groups to provide opportunities to those from low- or high- wealth 
groups (Elenbaas & Killen, 2018). The results revealed that children expected high wealth 
groups to be motivated by selfishness and low-wealth groups to be motivated by concerns 
stemming from broader economic inequality.  These findings indicate that economic status is 
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a salient group membership category for children and adolescents, one that is relatively 
under-studied in contrast to categories such as gender and race.   
To extend the literature, the current study investigated young people’s reasoning about 
exclusion based on economic status (high or low), and compared this form of exclusion to 
one that was not associated with groups (e.g., geographical location, such as living in two 
cities), and a control condition (e.g., no reason provided for group differences).  Given that 
wealth status is a salient group membership, it is important to know whether children and 
adolescents view it differently from other non-wealth related categories.  We introduced two 
other contextual factors, whether the exclusion was school- or peer-based, and whether the 
perpetrator was an authority figure (e.g., principal) or peers, to determine the situations in 
which different types of exclusion might be viewed as more or less wrong.  These contextual 
factors have been shown to bear on evaluations of gender and racial exclusion, but no 
reserach has analyzed these factors in the context of exclusion based on novel groups. 
Social reasoning developmental (SRD) theory guided this study (Killen, Elenbaas, & 
Rutland, 2015; Rutland & Killen, 2017). This theory draws from developmental social 
identity theory (Abrams & Rutland, 2008) as well as social domain theory (Smetana, Jambon, 
& Ball, 2014).  The theory proposes that understanding how individuals evaluate intergroup 
contexts requires an analysis of group identity, contextual features of exclusion situation, and 
forms of reasoning that are brought to bear on the evaluation (the latter two variables stem 
from social domain theory). Context matters because an act of exclusion that might be 
condoned in one context might be rejected in another context. This does not mean that 
judgments are not generalizable, however. Instead, it means that each situation provides 
different salient factors that change the interpretation of the consequences of exclusion 
because of the relative priority afforded each consideration. For example, in one context, 
social exclusion may be condoned because the need to maintain group identity (and group 
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loyalty) is high, and the potential for the act to involve harm to the excluded individual is 
very low.  In other situations, when the harm to an excluded individual is high then the group 
functioning concerns surrounding group identity may be viewed by individuals as irrelevant.  
Reasoning about acts in various contexts reveal how individuals balance these different 
considerations (as moral, societal, or psychological) (see Killen, et al., 2015).  
We propose that children’s reliance on moral reasons to evaluate exclusion based on  
ethnicity, nationality, and minority religious groups may be influenced by their explicit or 
implicit knowledge that these groups also vary in economic status (Bigler, Averhart, & Liben, 
2003; Olson, Shutts, Kinzler, & Weisman, 2012). Indeed, past studies on social exclusion 
examining these issues have focused on economically and historically disadvantaged groups, 
such as African-Americans in the U.S. (Brown, Mistry, & Bigler, 2007), Serbians in 
Switzerland (Malti, Killen, & Gasser, 2011), and Muslims in Denmark (Møller & 
Tenenbaum, 2011). The question thus arises over whether participants judge and reason 
differently about group-based exclusion when groups are presented as differing in economic 
status or differing based on other reasons.  
In the present study we used novel rather than pre-existing groups because it is difficult 
to tease apart whether children condemn exclusion of pre-existing groups as a result of 
inequality or because they have views about the wrongfulness of prejudice based on 
particular groups (including their own group).  For example, when children older than 7.5 
years were shown differential allocation of cookies to African-American versus European-
American children, they tended to adopt a strategy of rectifying the situation by providing 
more cookies to the group portrayed with fewer cookies (study 1). However, when the 
participants were either Asian-American versus European-American children, or children 
wearing different colored shirts, children chose to perpetuate the inequalities by giving more 
cookies to children portrayed with more cookies (studies 2 and 3) (Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & 
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Banaji, 2011). Participants’ differential patterns may stem from demand characteristics 
similar to the way children avoid explicit labelling of skin color by age 10 to 11 years 
(Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008).  
In the U.S., ethnic minority households are more likely to live in poverty than are 
White households (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). Thus, use of pre-existing groups may 
have confounded participants’ reasoning in the Olson et al. (2011) study. Similar to the U.S., 
the rate of living in a low-income household is greater for people from ethnic minority 
backgrounds than it is for White people in the U.K. (Kenway, 2007). For this reason, we told 
young people aged 8, 11, 14, and 20 years about novel groups of individuals who differed in 
economic status, geographic location, or for no reason (control). Using a similar paradigm, 
Horwitz et al. (2014) told 4- to 5-year-old children about imaginary people who differed in 
wealth. In the present study, we asked young people to evaluate exclusion by children and 
school principals in peer and school contexts.  Based on previous research (Killen et al., 
2002; Malti et al., 2012; Møller & Tenenbam, 2011), we expected young people to be less 
accepting of exclusion based on economic status than based on location or no reason, and to 
use less social conventional reasoning in the former than the latter conditions. 
Critically, little past work has examined whether contextual variations in children’s 
evaluation of exclusion varies with the perpetrator of exclusion. In one exception, Møller and 
Tenenbaum (2011) found that 8- to 12-year-old children judged it less fair when teachers 
rather than groups of students ordered peer exclusion. This finding follows from research on 
moral development in which children judged it better to abide by a moral act ordered by a 
peer than an immoral one ordered by a teacher (Kim, 1998). One limitation in Møller and 
Tenenbaum’s (2011) study is that both teachers and peers excluded children from peer 
contexts. Thus, it is unknown whether children thought it was worse because authority 
figures were condoning exclusion or because children believed that authority figures should 
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restrict their decisions to contexts in which they have authority (e.g., schools). Indeed, 
children are apt to believe that friendship concerns should be considered personal issues that 
are under children’s jurisdiction (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Bitz, 1994). Young 
people become more concerned with making their own decisions in the personal domain 
between the ages of 11 and 14 years (Darling, Cumsille, & Martinez, 2008) so we would 
expect the 14- and 20-year-olds to not be accepting of the legitimacy of adult authority in 
peer contexts. In addition, we would expect the older three age groups to use more social 
conventional reasoning when discussing exclusion perpetrated by a principal in peer contexts. 
We selected young people aged 8, 11, and 14 years to be comparable to past research, which 
has found increased concern for autonomy with age (Darling et al., 2008). Moreover,  
adolescents begin to weigh up considerations of group functioning and ingroup loyalty 
(Killen & Rutland, 2011) and have a greater understanding of group norms than younger 
children (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009). We chose to also include 20-year-old 
students to see whether any developmental patterns we found continued to be present in an 
older age group. 
Age may also influence other aspects of judgements and reasoning, which we evaluate 
with two related sets of empirical findings: distribution of resources and social exclusion. 
Research on distribution of resources suggests that children tend to use fairness norms to 
allocate resources equally (Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Shaw & Olson, 
2012; Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2015) and prefer children who follow fairness norms 
(Cooley & Killen, 2015). Of note, however, there are some developmental differences with 
older children disapproving more of economic inequalities than younger children. For 
example, Elenbaas and Killen (2016) found that children aged 10 to 11 years were more 
likely than children aged 5 to 6 to rectify past unequal resource allocation to hospitals serving 
African-American children by allocating more resources to hospitals serving African-
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American than European-American children. This literature suggests that in general children, 
and especially older children, should be more disapproving of economic inequality than 
younger children.  
In sum, in the present study we investigated 8, 11-, 14- and 20-year-old’s reasoning 
about exclusion from peer groups and school contexts in novel groups that differed based on 
unequal economic status, geographical location, or no reason. The advantage of novel groups 
was that participants reasoned about third-party exclusion in which they were not members of 
either group. We present two sets of hypotheses. First, based on Møller and Tenenabum 
(2011), we hypothesised that young people would condemn exclusion more in school than in 
peer contexts and to be more apt to condemn exclusion when the perpetrator was a principal 
rather than a child. However, we also predicted an interaction effect in which young people 
would judge exclusion by a principal as worse in peer contexts than in school contexts 
because of their belief that friendship falls under the personal domain (Smetana & Asquith, 
1994) and this to be especially true of those over 11 years who are more concerned with 
autonomy (Ruck, Tenenbaum, & Willenberg, 2011).  In terms of condition, we expected that 
young people would view exclusion as less acceptable when they evaluated the unequal 
economic status condition than the other two conditions. We expected that this would be 
especially true of children and adolescents over 8 years based on Elenbaas and Killen (2016).  
Second, in terms of reasoning, based on Killen et al. (2002) and Møller and Tenenbaum 
(2011), we expected young people to use more moral reasoning when the context was school 
rather than peer groups and when a principal excluded than when a child excluded. In 
contrast, we expected children to use less social conventional reasoning when the context was 
school rather than peer groups and when a principal excluded than when a child excluded. We 
also hypothesized that 14- and 20-year-olds would use more social conventional reasons than 
would 8-year-olds in the peer contexts when the exclusion was condoned by principals. In 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, available online at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096517304964. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2018, Elsevier. 
terms of condition, we expected that young people would use more moral reasoning when 
they were allocated to the condition in which exclusion implicates differences in unequal 
economic status than in the other conditions. In contrast, we expected participants to use 
social conventional reasoning less when allocated to the condition in which exclusion 
implicates differences in unequal economic status than in the other conditions.  
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 312 participants from the greater London, U.K. Urban 
Area ranging in age from 7 to 25 years.  The sample was divided into four age groups: 8 
years (M = 8 years, 9 months, SD = 6.90 months; range 7 years, 10 months to 9 years, 11 
months; 50 males, 30 females), 11 years (M = 11 years, 6 months, SD = 6.39 months; 
range 10 years, 6 months to 12 years, 6 months; 29 males, 56 females), and 14 years (M 
= 13 years, 9 months, SD = 4.72 months; range 13 years, 0 months to 14 years, 11 
months; 18 males, 55 females), and 20 years (M = 20 years, SD = 1.29 years; range 19 
years to 25 years; 10 males, 63 females). The 8-year-old group attended primary schools 
and the 14-year-old age group attended secondary schools. The 11-year-old group came 
from either primary or secondary schools. The 20-year-old group were psychology 
students at a state university. 
To recruit the child sample, email messages were sent to principals of state 
schools in London and counties in southeast England. Principals who agreed for students 
to be interviewed were sent parental information and consent forms to be distributed in 
Years 4, 6, and 9. All children whose parents returned a signed consent form were 
interviewed. The sample was representative of the UK population (88.2% of this part of 
England is White; Home Office, 2007).  The majority (84.8%) of 8- to 14-year-olds 
identified as White British, 2.7% as mixed race, 5.9% as Asian British (mostly of Indian 
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and Pakistani descent), 5.4% as Black African or Black Caribbean British, and 1% as 
Chinese or East Asian British. 
We examined the socio-economic status of the neighborhoods from which 
schools drew their students. All 32,844 neighborhoods in England can be ranked by their 
multiple deprivation scores (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2015), 
which combine data from income, employment, health deprivation, education skills, 
barriers to housing and services, crime, and living environment. These scores are 
reported in deciles with one being the most deprived and 10 being the least deprived. The 
neighbourhoods from which the schools in this study drew children from neighbourhoods 
that had deciles ranging from 5 (average for the UK) to 10 (highest decile) with a mean 
decile of 8. As much as possible, we chose primary schools that were feeder schools for 
the secondary schools. As a result, there were no differences in multiple deprivation 
scores between the primary and secondary schools. Thus, children came from just below 
the middle to the top of the economic social strata in the UK. 
The adult sample was recruited using a psychology subject pool in which students 
who participate are allowed access to the subject pool for their final-year research 
projects if they complete 20 hours of studies. 
Procedures and Materials 
The University of [blinded] granted the project, “There has to be Room for 
Everybody to Join: Children’s Reasoning about Social Groups in Peer and School 
Contexts” EC/2014/38/FAHS) ethical approval for those under 18 years and SAFE 
160708-160702-14008249 for those 18 years and over. For the sample that was under 
aged 18 years, letters describing the study to parents were sent home through the 
children’s schools. Parents provided written consent and their children gave verbal assent 
before being interviewed. Children were interviewed individually in a quiet room or area 
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in their school. Eight hypothetical vignettes were presented to each child. Table 2 
presents the vignettes used in the study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (economic status, 
geographical location, control) in a between-subjects design. Each condition had eight 
vignettes. For this study we used novel groups. Participants were asked to imagine a place 
where people were different colors (e.g., for four vignettes people were either blue or green 
and for the other four people were either yellow or red). For the unequal economic status 
condition, children were told that one group had lots of money, whereas the other people 
were poor. For four of the vignettes, the group with more money excluded the group with less 
money. For the other four vignettes, the group with less money excluded the group with more 
money. In the different location condition, participants were told that the two groups of 
people lived in different cities. In the control condition, participants were not told any prior 
information about the groups and were simply told “Imagine two groups of people, Blues and 
Greens (Yellow and Reds). I am going to tell you eight stories about them. Let’s see what 
you think.” Table 2 shows the exact wording for the unequal economic status and location 
conditions. The colors of children in the hypothetical vignettes varied across the participants 
and vignettes.   
The perpetrator of the exclusion and context in which exclusion occurred varied, with 
two vignettes for each type of vignette. In other words, there were two vignettes for each type 
involving 1) a principal excluding a child from a school context, 2) a principal excluding a 
child from a peer context, 3) children excluding another child from a school context, and 4) 
children excluding another child from a peer context for a total of eight vignettes.  
The research assistants read each vignette to the child participants. After the 
presentation of each vignette, children were asked whether it was ok or not ok for the 
story character to exclude the child on a 5-point Likert scale from no a lot (1) to yes a lot 
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(5).  In addition, participants were asked to provide a rationale or justification for their 
response. Probes were used to help participants clarify their specific responses and 
thinking (e.g., “Can you explain what you mean by that?”, “Tell me a little more about 
that.”).  Children were individually interviewed for approximately 15 minutes. All 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. The order of presentation of the 
vignettes was counterbalanced.   
In contrast to the younger participants, information was presented to the 
university students in an online format using Qualtrics. Space was left for participants to 
explain their reasoning after each vignette. They were not allowed to proceed to the next 
question without typing an answer into the free text space after the vignette. On average, 
it took university participants 10 minutes and 14 seconds to complete the online 
questionnaire. 
Coding and Reliability 
Based in part on past research (Møller & Tenenbaum, 2011) and a close reading of the 
interviews, a justification coding system was developed. The coding system was based on 
two categories, which included: (a) moral, which refers to fairness and equality of rights 
(e.g., “The Red child should be able to play because she has the same rights as the Yellow 
children”); (b) social convention, which refers to authority (e.g., “it’s like his school and his 
rules so he decides”; “they have the same opinion as their mummy and daddy do about what 
school they should go to”), societal norms (e.g. “there is like boys’ and girls’ schools boys 
and girls aren’t allowed to go over and the same yellow and reds.”) and group functioning 
(e.g., “if they are trying to segregate groups because there have been arguments in the past 
that is ok”). Children could use more than one category. Participants’ answers (i.e., moral or 
social convention) were coded as 0 when not using category, .5 when partially using a 
category, or 1 when using a category fully. When two justifications were used, each 
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justification was coded as .5 (see Malti, et al., 2010). No other scores were permissible. 
Because participants were asked two questions of each type (e.g., principals excluding in a 
peer context), scores ranged from 0 to 2. To obtain inter-rater reliability, the first and third 
authors met and coded 20 interviews together over the course of a few hours. These authors 
then coded 62 interviews (20% of the data set) separately. Uncertainties or discrepancies in 
the coding were resolved through discussion. Cohen’s kappa () was calculated as a measure 
of inter-rater agreement. Inter-rater agreement was .73, which indicates a good level of 
agreement (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). The third author coded the remaining transcripts.  
Results 
For each of the major variables of interest, results are presented separately for 
endorsements and justifications. Only main effects and interactions related to the hypotheses 
are reported. For each vignette, endorsement scores could range from 1 (not at all ok) to 5 
(ok). Note that we created a mean for each of the four types of vignettes by summing the two 
vignettes involving 1) a principal excluding a child from a school context, 2) a principal 
excluding a child from a peer context, 3) children excluding another child from a school 
context, 4) children excluding another child from a peer context. Thus, there were four types 
of vignettes investigated in the current study. 
Endorsements  
To examine the first set of hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (Context: School, Peer) x 2 
(Perpetrator: Children, Principal) x 3 (Condition: Unequal Economic Status, Location, 
Control) x 4 (Age: 8, 11, 14, 20) mixed-design ANOVA. Context and Perpetrator served as 
within-subjects factors, and Age and Condition served as between-subjects factors. The mean 
ratings on whether it was ok to exclude served as the DV. Table 3 shows mean endorsement 
ratings by perpetrator and context. 
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Descriptive Statistics. Across the eight vignettes, participants did not support 
exclusion (M = 1.43, SD = .54). There was a main effect of age, F (3, 300) = 11.22, p < 
.0001, partial ŋ2 = .10. Follow-up tests with a Bonferroni correction indicated that 11-year-
olds (M = 1.38, SD = .42, p < .0001), 14-year-olds (M = 1.38, SD = .45, p < .0001), and 20-
year-olds (M = 1.26, SD = .51, p = .001) thought it was even less acceptable to exclude 
children than did 8-year-olds (M = 1.71, SD = .67). The older age groups did not differ from 
one another.  
Context and Perpetrator. First, there was a main effect of Context, F (1, 293) = 11.36, 
p = .001, partial ŋ2 = .04. In contrast to the hypothesis that participants would condemn 
exclusion more in school than in peer contexts, participants thought it was less acceptable for 
children to be excluded from peer (M = 1.32, SD = .38) than school (M = 1.46, SD = .51) 
contexts.  
Second, there was a main effect of Perpetrator, F (1, 293) = 22.80, p = .0001, partial 
ŋ2 = .07. Again, contrary to the hypothesis that participants would be more apt to condemn 
exclusion when the perpetrator was a principal than children, participants thought it was less 
acceptable when children (M= 1.37, SD = .52) excluded someone than a principal (M = 1.50, 
SD = .67).  
The perpetrator effect was further qualified by significant Perpetrator x Age, F (3, 
293) = 4.99, p = .002, partial ŋ2 = .05, interaction effect. Using .01 as a corrected p-value, 
four separate repeated-measures one-way ANOVAs were conducted for each of the three age 
groups to tease apart the Age x Perpetrator interaction. Perpetrator served as repeated-
measures factor. The 20-year-olds, F < 1, did not differentiate between the perpetrators. 
Eight-year-olds, F (1, 79) = 15.96, p = .0001, partial ŋ2 = .16, 11-year-olds, F (1, 84) = 4.46, 
p = .01, partial ŋ2 = .05, and 14-year-olds, F (1, 73) = 7.39, p = .008, partial ŋ2 = .09, 
believed that it was less acceptable for children (8-year-olds: M = 1.57, SD = .66; 11 year-
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olds: M = 1.36, SD = .45, 14-year-olds: M = 1.30, SD = .37) to exclude than a principal (8-
year-olds: M = 1.84, SD = .81, 11-year-olds: M = 1.46, SD = .55, 14-year-olds: M = 1.47, SD 
= .64).  
These effects were also qualified by a significant Perpetrator x Context x Age, F (3, 
300) = 4.48, p = .004, partial ŋ2 = .04. To examine this interaction effect in relation to the 
hypothesis that young people would judge exclusion by a principal as worse in peer contexts 
than in school contexts, we conducted four one-way repeated measures ANOVAs (.01 was 
the protected alpha level) separately for each age group with perpetrator held as a constant to 
see if children thought it worse for a principal to exclude in the peer than the school context. 
Eight-year-olds, F < 1, and 11-year-olds, F (1, 84) = 5.56, p = .02, partial ŋ2 = .06, did not 
distinguish between principals’ decisions in school and peer contexts. As hypothesized that 
the older age groups would judge exclusion by a principal as worse in peer contexts than in 
school contexts, 14-year-olds, F (1, 73) = 6.15, p = .01, partial ŋ2 = .08, and 20-year-olds, F 
(1, 72) = 9.97, p = .002, partial ŋ2 = .12, thought it was worse for a principal to exclude in 
peer (14 year-olds: M = 1.36, SD = .58; 20 year-olds: M = 1.2, SD = .45) than in school 
contexts (14 year-olds: M = 1.57, SD = .87; 20 year-olds: M = 1.37, SD = .82). No age group 
distinguished between school or peer exclusion when the perpetrator of exclusion was 
children, 8 year-olds: F (1, 79) = 3.00, p = .09, 11 year-olds: F (1, 84) = 3.46, p = .07, 14 
year-olds: F < 1, and 20-year-olds: F (1, 72) = 1.54, p = .22. 
Condition. Although the hypothesized Condition effect in which we expected that 
children assigned to the unequal economic status condition would rate exclusion as worse 
than children assigned to either the location or control conditions was not significant, F < 1, 
there was a significant Condition x Age, F (6, 300) = 3.38, p = .003, partial ŋ2 = .06 
interaction effect. However, the two-way interaction was qualified by a significant 
Perpetrator x Condition x Age, F (4, 300) = 4.09, p = .001, partial ŋ2 = .08 interaction effect.  
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To untangle the Perpetrator x Condition x Age interaction effect, eight one-way 
ANOVAs in total were conducted. These ANOVAs were separately for each age group and 
perpetrator with condition as a between-subjects factor. For all age groups, there was no 
effect of condition on the children as perpetrator vignettes (8 year-olds: F <1; 11 year-olds: F 
< 1; 14 year-olds: F (1, 71) = 2.26, p = .11; 20-year-olds, F (1, 70) = 1.03, p = .36).  
When the principal was the perpetrator, there was an effect of condition for 8-year-old 
children, F (2, 77) = 6.07, p = .004, partial ŋ2 = .14 and 14-year-old children, F (2, 71) = 
5.97, p = .004, partial ŋ2 = .14. When the principal was the perpetrator there was no effect of 
condition for 11-year-old or 20-year-old participants, both Fs < 1. As hypothesized, 
Bonferroni follow-up tests indicated that 8-year-old children believed that exclusion was less 
acceptable when they were assigned to the unequal economic status (M = 1.44, SD = .58) 
than location (p = .02, M = 2.02, SD = .76) or control (p = .008, M = 2.11, SD = .96) 
conditions. In contrast, 14-year-olds thought exclusion was even less acceptable when they 
were assigned to the location (p = .02, M = 1.36, SD = .55) or control (p = .006, M = 1.26, SD 
= .36) conditions than unequal economic status (M = 1.83, SD = .82) conditions. Children 
assigned to the location and control conditions did not differ from one another in either age 
group. Figure 1 shows these means. 
Reasoning 
To examine reasoning, we conducted two 2 (Context: School, Peer) x 2 (Perpetrator: 
Peer, Principal) x 3 (Condition: Unequal Economic Status, Location, Control) x 4 (Age: 8, 
11, 14, 20) mixed-design ANOVAs separately on the numbers of time children used Social 
Conventional and Moral Reasoning. Context and Perpetrator served as within-subjects 
factors, and Age and Condition served as between-subjects factors. We followed Malti et al. 
(2012) in assigning partial credit when more than one justification was used. Table 4 shows 
mean ratings of moral and social conventional reasons separately by perpetrator and context. 
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Effects related to the hypotheses are reported. Note that children’s total answers across all 
eight vignettes could range from 0 to 8 and for each type of vignette from 0 to 2. 
Social Conventional Reasoning 
Context and Perpetrator. In contrast to the hypothesis that participants would use less 
social conventional reasoning when the context was school rather than peer groups, 
participants used more social conventional reasoning in the school context (M = 1.37, SD = 
1.14) than peer groups (M = 1.12, SD = .98), F (1, 299) = 12.22, p = .001, partial ŋ2 = .04.  
Also in contrast to the hypothesis, participants were more likely to view exclusion by 
a principal (M = 1.34, SD = 1.00) as a social conventional issue than by children (M = 1.15, 
SD = 1.01), F (1, 299) = 8.52, p = .004, partial ŋ2 = .03. This effect, however, was qualified 
by a significant Perpetrator x Age interaction effect, F (1, 299) = 2.91, p = .04, partial ŋ2 = 
.03, and significant Perpetrator x Context interaction effect, F (1, 299) = 74.79, p < .0001, 
partial ŋ2 = .20. Using .01 as the protected alpha level, four repeated-measures ANOVAs 
were conducted separately for social conventional reason to examine whether participants at 
different ages reasoned differently when the perpetrator varied. Supporting the hypothesis for 
20-year-olds only, participants used more social conventional reasons when principals (M = 
.95, SD = 1.22) rather than children (M = .50, SD = .90) were the ones to exclude, F (1, 72) = 
8.80, p = .004, partial ŋ2 = .11. However, there were no significant differences in 8 year-olds: 
F (1, 79) = 5.87, p = .02, 11 year-olds: F <1, 14 year-olds: F < 1.  
We followed up the significant Perpetrator x Context interaction effect with two 
within-subjects with perpetrator as a repeated factor separated by context. Although we had 
predicted only the two older age groups would view exclusion in peer contexts as more of 
social conventional issue when the perpetrator was a principal than a child, the effect was 
found across the age groups. Participants used more social conventional reasoning when the 
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principal (M = .73, SD = .69) rather than children (M = .39, SD = .52) enacted peer exclusion, 
F (1, 310) = 8.80, p < .001, partial ŋ2 = .18.  
Condition. Contrary to the hypothesis that young people would use less social 
conventional reasoning when they were allocated to the condition in which exclusion 
implicates differences in unequal economic status than in other conditions, there was not a 
main effect of Condition, F (6, 299) = 2.14, p = .12. There was, however, a significant 
Condition x Age Group interaction, F (6, 299) = 2.20, p = .04, partial ŋ2 = .04.  Using .01 as a 
protected alpha level, this effect was followed up by conducting ANOVAs with condition as 
an IV and social conventional reasoning as a DV. There were significant effects on social 
conventional reasoning for 11-year-olds, F (2, 82) = 4.06, p = .02, partial ŋ2 = .09, and 14-
year-olds, F (2, 70) = 4.58, p = .01, partial ŋ2 = .12. Bonferroni follow-ups indicated that 11-
year-olds were more likely to invoke social conventional reasoning for the unequal economic 
status (M = 3.03, SD = 1.53) than control condition (M = 1.85, SD = 1.60, p = .02).  Those 
assigned to the location condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.81) did not differ from the other 
conditions. Similarly, Bonferroni follow-ups indicated that 14-year-olds were more likely to 
invoke social conventional reasoning for the unequal economic status (M = 3.31, SD = 1.27) 
than control condition (M = 2.08, SD = 1.27, p = .01). Those assigned to the location 
condition (M = 2.68, SD = 1.48) invoked this type of reasoning an intermediate amount. 
Participants assigned to the location condition did not differ from participants assigned to 
other conditions. The other age groups did not invoke different amounts of social 
conventional reasoning based on the condition to which they were assigned (8-year-olds: F 
<1, 20-year-olds: F (2, 70) = 1.30, p = .28). 
Moral Reasoning 
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Context. There was a main effect of context in which young people were more likely 
to use moral reasoning for the peer (M = 2.31, SD = 1.14) than school (M = 1.94, SD = 1.32) 
contexts, F (1, 299) = 24.98, p < .0001, partial ŋ2 = .07. 
Perpetrator. Contrary to our expectation that young people would use more moral 
reasoning when a principal excluded than when children excluded, young people used more 
moral reasoning when children (M = 2.24, SD = 1.17) than a principal (M = 2.00, SD = 1.22) 
excluded, F (1, 299) = 15.47, p < .0001, partial ŋ2 = .05.  This effect was, however, qualified 
by significant Perpetrator x Age, F (2, 299) = 2.79, p = .04, partial ŋ2 = .03, and Context x 
Perpetrator, F (1, 299) = 66.71, p < .0001, partial ŋ2 = .18, interaction effects. Using .01 as 
the protected alpha level, four repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted separately for 
each perpetrator. Following the previously described pattern, 8-year-old, F (1, 79) = 8.96, p = 
.004, partial ŋ2 = .10, and 20-year-old, F (1, 72) = 9.58, p = .003, partial ŋ2 = .12, participants 
used less moral reasoning when principals (8: M = 1.71, SD = 1.13, 20: M = 1.39, SD = 1.28) 
rather than children (8: M = 2.08, SD = 1.14, 20: M = 1.80, SD = 1.36) were the ones to tell 
their peers that they could not play. However, there were no significant differences in 11 
year-olds: F <1, or 14 year-olds: F (1, 72) = 2.97, p = .09.  
To take apart the Context x Perpetrator interaction effect, two repeated-measures 
ANOVA models were conducted on person holding context constant. Young people were 
more likely to use moral reasoning when discussing principals (M = 1.03, SD = .76) than 
children (M = .91, SD = .75) in school contexts, F (1, 311) = 8.77, p = .003, partial ŋ2 = .03. 
In contrast, young people were less likely to use moral reasoning when discussing principals 
(M = .97, SD = .70) than children (M = 1.34, SD = .67) in school contexts, F (1, 311) = 72.69, 
p < .0001, partial ŋ2 = .19. 
Condition. Contrary to the hypothesis that young people would use more moral 
reasons when they were allocated to the condition in which exclusion implicates differences 
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in unequal economic status than in other conditions, there was no effect of Condition on 
young people’s moral reasoning, F (2, 299) = 1.06, p = .35.  
Discussion 
This study extends knowledge of how young people in the UK consider different types 
of exclusion. It is important, first, to point out that participants did not condone exclusion. 
The mean scores indicated that participants’ evaluations of exclusion ranged from strongly 
disagreeing to somewhat disagreeing with exclusion. That being said, there were striking 
variations in participants’ judgments and reasoning based on age and contextual differences 
across the vignettes. In addition, many of findings the differed from previous research. 
Participants in this study were sensitive to economic status differences in the vignettes, 
but not always in the hypothesized direction. Contrary to the hypothesis that young people 
would view exclusion as less acceptable when evaluating the unequal status condition than 
the other conditions, only 8-year-old children thought it was worse for a principal to exclude 
when children evaluated the unequal economic status condition than the other conditions. In 
contrast, 14-year-olds believed exclusion by a principal was most acceptable when there were 
economic status differences than when there were not. Finally, 11- and 20-year-olds did not 
show differences in their exclusion judgements based on the condition to which they were 
assigned. Contrary to the hypothesis that young people would use less social conventional 
and more moral reasoning when assigned to the unequal economic status condition than the 
other conditions, both 11- and 14-year-olds used more social conventional reasoning when 
evaluating the unequal economic status condition than the other conditions. The 11-year-olds, 
thus, demonstrated an intermediate pattern with their reasoning being similar to 14-year-olds, 
but not their ratings.  
The age-related findings in the present study may also suggest that economic inequality 
might not be perceived as unfair compared to other reasons for social exclusion once young 
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people reach early adolescence (Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom, 2017). From 18 months of age, 
children distribute resources, such as marbles, equally (Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2015). 
Between the ages of 3 and 8 years, children continue to distribute resources, such as erasers, 
equally to the point of discarding a resource to create equality (Shaw & Olson, 2012). Young 
people between the ages of 9 and 17 years tend to share equally (Gummerum, Keller, 
Takezawa, & Mata, 2008). Furthermore, children between the ages of 3 to 6 years prefer 
peers who allocate resources equally (Cooley & Killen, 2015). Children even prefer equality 
when they stand to gain from unequal distribution of resources (Cooley & Killen, 2015; 
Gummerum et al., 2008). Thus, from a young age people tend to prefer fairness.  
At the same time, children do not always favour those with less. Indeed, young children 
prefer individuals pictured with more resources, such as play-dough (Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 
2014, study 2). Children also prefer those pictured in more expensive houses than less 
expensive houses (Horwitz et al., 2014). Thus, the findings are somewhat equivocal. 
Moreover, when additional information, such as effort is included, slightly older 
children prefer to reward differential effort with a matching distribution of resources (Shaw 
& Olson, 2012; Wimmer, Wachter, & Perner, 1982). With age, children are better able to 
take additional factors into account when deciding distribution of resources, such as effort 
and intention (Piaget, 1932). Such an ability may be why adolescents do not favor a purely 
equal distribution of wealth (Arsenio & Willems, 2017). Inequality and fairness become even 
more distinct concepts with developmental increases in the ability to incorporate a range of 
factors into resource allocation. It seems, as Starmans et al. (2017) have argued, that 
inequality and fairness are distinct concepts that are often conflated in research studies.  
One way past research has conflated economic inequality and fairness is through using 
social groups that vary in access to wealth. By examining exclusion based on economic 
inequality without invoking social groups, in this study young people considered economic 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, available online at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096517304964. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2018, Elsevier. 
inequality without recourse to discrimination based on social groups. Not surprisingly, 
children do not accept economic inequalities when they vary with ethnicity, suggesting that 
children view such relationships as unfair (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016). However, when 
ethnicity is separated from economic inequality, children over 9 years from middle-class 
backgrounds in the UK support income disparities (Emler & Dickinson, 1985) arguing that 
income differentials are fair.  Beginning at age 9 years, English children show implicit biases 
towards members of lower-social classes compared to members of upper-social classes 
(Tenenbaum & MacNamara, 2017).   
In contrast, however, British children age 8 years old do not support income 
differentials (Emler & Dickinson, 1985). Moreover, 90% of US African-American and White 
8-year-old children from a mixture of socio-economic statuses did not think poverty was fair 
with only 12% attributing internal causes (e.g., psychological characteristics) to the causes of 
poverty (Chafel & Neitzel, 2005). Thus, it seems that societal income equality becomes a 
distinct concept from fairness in resource allocation after age 8 years.   
Why might children start to separate fairness from economic inequality with age? As 
we mentioned, one reason may be cognitive and moral advances that enable children to 
integrate multiple pieces of information into a situation to evaluate it (Gummerum et al., 
2008; Piaget, 1932). From an intergroup perspective, children also evidence a greater 
understanding of how groups function and an increased social theory of mind at 9 to 11 years 
than at 6 to 8 years (Abrams et al., 2011). By 11 years, children rely more on social 
conventional norms in their reasoning than at younger ages (Killen et al., 2002).  Thus, they 
begin to understand societal groups differently. At 14 years of age, children in this study had 
consistent reasoning and rating patterns, which may result from increased understanding of 
groups that surpassed even the 11-year-olds’ understanding. Indeed, with age children may 
expect groups to benefit themselves (Elenbaas & Killen, 2018). When asked to imagine how 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, available online at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022096517304964. It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2018, Elsevier. 
low- and high-income children would allocate a limited resource (i.e., camp places), there 
was an increase between 8 and 14 years in children believing that others would benefit the 
ingroup more than the outgroup by allocating more places to their own group. Moreover, past 
work has suggested that children from higher income families (Elenbaas & Killen, 2018), 
such as the young people in this sample, tend to expect that groups will benefit themselves. 
The young people may have simply expected groups to exclude people from other groups. 
Young people in this study, however, viewed exclusion differently depending on the 
group from which the protagonist was excluded. Disconfirming the hypotheses that 
participants would believe that exclusion was worse in school than in peer contexts, 
participants from the four age groups thought exclusion was worse in peer than in school 
contexts. Participants also used more moral reasoning for peer contexts than for school 
contexts. Conversely, participants used more social conventional reasoning for school than 
peer contexts. In a past study, British young people between 8 am 14 years supported single-
gender schools (Tenenbaum et al., 2017). Thus, British young people seem to perceive school 
segregation as acceptable and a social conventional issue. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that young adolescents in the UK are apprenticed into accepting the organisation of 
societal institutions. 
Additional support for the view that young people in the UK accept the structure of 
society is their relative acceptance of authority compared to children in this study. Although 
we had predicted that young people would not accept principals’ authority over children’s 
authority and that they would use fewer social conventional reasons for the vignettes in which 
principals rather than peers were perpetrators of exclusion, we again found the opposite 
pattern. Instead, young people supported principals more than peers and used more social 
conventional reasons for the former than the latter. This finding differs from work conducted 
in Denmark in which 8- to 12-year-olds thought it was worse for a teacher than a child to 
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exclude (Møller & Tenenbaum, 2011), and in the USA where 8- to 14-year-olds rated it less 
acceptable when parents than children excluded (Killen et al., 2002). There are at least three 
possible explanations for these findings. First, Denmark has a more equal society than the UK 
based on the Gini index (World Bank, 2018). Thus, the cultural discourse may vary, 
particularly insofar as it relates to issues of equality and inequality.  
Related to issues of equality, the UK has a long history of state schools segregated by 
gender and faith (see Tenenbaum et al., 2017, for a discussion of how this may influence 
young people’s reasoning). In contrast, until 2006, the USA had not allowed single-gender 
state schools for more than three decades (No Child Left Behind Act, 2001); numbers of 
single-gender schools remain low. As a result of seeing school segregation, young British 
people may come to accept structural segregation in society. Preliminary support for the view 
that societal segregation may influence acceptance of authority also comes from Saudi Arabia 
in which most institutions are strictly gender segregated (Alhareth, Alhareth, & Al Dighrir, 
2015). In a recent study, Saudi children supported religious-based peer exclusion enacted by 
fathers more than by peers, and justified the latter with social conventional reasoning 
(Alsamih & Tenenbaum, 2018). To understand how cultural discourses may influence 
children across the world, we need to conduct research in other cultural communities, 
especially communities that have institutional segregation, larger economic disparities, and 
even more hierarchical organization than the ones studied in most of the literature (Nielsen, 
Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017). 
Third, the present study used third-party exclusion in which participants were not 
members of either group.  Adults tend to evaluate first-party moral transgressions less harshly 
compared to third-party transgressions, and regard first-party transgressions as less severe 
(Haviv & Leman, 2002; Wark & Krebs, 2000). Moreover, 5- to 6-year-old children judge 
resources allocation as more unfair when their group compared to another group is 
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disadvantaged (Elenbaas, Rizzo, & Killen, 2016). Children aged 10 to 11 years do not make 
this distinction. Children’s moral judgments might therefore differ when evaluating first- and 
third-party depending on their knowledge of groups and of their own membership of groups. 
Support for authority was tempered in peer groups in the two older age groups who 
rated it as less acceptable for principals to exclude in peer contexts than in school contexts. 
Surprisingly, the older age groups were not generally more accepting of peer exclusion nor 
did they use more social conventional reasoning than younger children. We had expected that 
they might be more accepting of peer exclusion because of a greater understanding of group 
functioning (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Mulvey, 2016). The older age groups did, however, 
believe that it was worse for a principal to exclude in peer than in school contexts. This 
finding suggests that the older age groups, who are frequently more concerned with 
autonomy (Ruck et al., 2011), view exclusion in peer groups as an issue that should not be 
within the jurisdiction of authority (Smetana & Asquith, 1994; Smetana & Bitz, 1994; 
Darling et al., 2008).  
One final age-related difference is worth noting. Unlike previous research, the older 
participants were less accepting of exclusion than were 8-year-old children. One reason this 
might have been the case is because the vignettes were about third-party exclusion in which 
children were not members of either group. Although explicit in-group bias decreases after 
age 7 years (Raabe & Beelman, 2012), children have an increased understanding of group 
nous (Abrams et al., 2009) and show increases in social conventional understanding (Killen 
et al., 2002), which may lead to higher levels of exclusion. Future research will need to 
compare directly exclusion when children are members of the groups of interest and when 
they are not. 
One potential limitation of the present study is that we used experimental and abstract 
groups. However, our work suggests that novel groups complement actual groups by 
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controlling for historical and personal information about actual (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) and minimal groups (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Vople, & Ropp, 1997). 
Moreover, differences in reasoning patterns suggest that children were sensitive to the 
information contained in the vignettes. A second limitation is that some of the peer contexts, 
such as eating lunch, occurred in the school, and might have blurred the distinction between 
pure peer and school contexts. Third, our research followed previous research in having a 
group of children serve as perpetrators of exclusion (e.g., Malti et al., 2012; Møller & 
Tenenbaum, 2011; Tenenbaum et al., 2017). However, young people may have felt that it 
was more difficult to challenge a group of children than a single child. Third, it would have 
been beneficial to have included other measures, such as attitudes towards inequality, class 
bias, and children’s own socio-economic status.  
In sum, our study extended the domain perspective. In contrast to past research (Killen 
et al., 2002; Malti et al., 2012), young people were less accepting of segregation in peer than 
schools contexts and when enacted by peers than principals across condition and age groups. 
Our findings, along with others (Tenenbaum et al., 2017; Alsamih & Tenenbaum, 2018), 
suggest that young people in societies in which institutions, such as state school are 
segregated, may come to accept societal segregation and defer to authority in such cases. 
However, these young people were less accepting of segregation in peer groups than schools 
and when enacted by children than principals. Thus, these young people did not accept 
exclusion when it was perceived as under the jurisdiction of interpersonal relationships.  
Future research is needed to understand how to extend young people’s rejection of inequality 
and exclusion in peer relations to societal institutions to advocate for a more equal society. 
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Table 1. Eight Vignettes 
Context 
School  Peer 
 
Principal as Perpetrator    
                                     
  
A group of red children are going to school. The principal tells a 
yellow child that he/she cannot go to their school. This child has 
to go the school for yellow children.  
 
A group of green children are going to school. The principal 
tells a blue child that he/she cannot go to their school. This child 
has to go the school for blue children.  
 
 A group of red children are playing a game of cards and a 
yellow child wants to join them. The principal says that the 




A group of green children are eating together in the school 
cafeteria and a blue child wants to join them. The principal says 
that the blue child cannot because only green children can eat at 
this table.  
 
   
Child as Perpetrator                                     
A group of green children are going to school. They tell a blue 
child that he/she cannot go to their school. This child has to go 
to the school for Blue children.  
 
A group of red children are going to school. They tell a yellow 
child that he/she cannot go to their school. This child has to go 
to the school for yellow children. 
  
A group of red children are going to the cinema together and a 
yellow child wants to join them. The red children say that the 
yellow child cannot because only red children can go to the 
cinema. 
A group of green children are playing football together and a 
blue child wants to join them. The green children say that the 
blue child cannot because only green children can play football. 
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Table 2. Information Provided to Children in the Conditions 
Condition 
Unequal Economic Status 
Version 1. “Imagine two groups of people: Yellows and Reds. 
The Yellow people have lots of money, whereas the Reds do not 
have a lot of money. The Yellow people live in big houses and 
the Red People live in small houses. Now I am going to tell you 
four stories about these people, let’s see what you think about 
them.” 
 
 Unequal Economic Status 
Version 2. “Imagine two groups of people: Blues and Greens. 
The Blue people have lots of money, whereas the Greens do not 
have a lot of money. The Blue people live in big houses and the 
Green People live in small houses. Now I am going to tell you 





Version 1. “Imagine two groups of people: Yellow and Reds. 
The Yellow people come from one city and the Red people 
come from a different city. They both have the same amount of 
money. Now I am going to tell you four stories about these 




Version 2. “Imagine two groups of people: Blues and Greens. 
The Green people come from one city and the Blue people come 
from a different city. They both have the same amount of 
money. Now I am going to tell you four stories about these 
people, let’s see what you think about them.” 
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Table 3 
Mean Acceptability Ratings Collapsed Across Condition  
 
 Child  Principal  
 School Peer School Peer 
Age 8 (n = 80) 1.66 (.92) 1.48 (.67) 1.81 (.95) 1.86 (1.00) 
Age 11 (n = 85) 1.40 (.67) 1.27 (.39) 1.52 (.71) 1.33 (.49) 
Age 14 (n = 74) 1.32 (.56) 1.28 (.39) 1.57 (.87) 1.36 (.58) 
Age 20 (n = 73) 1.30 (.67) 1.23 (.55) 1.37 (.82) 1.12 (.45) 
Total 1.42 (.73) 1.32 (.52) 1.57 (.85) 1.43 (.72) 
Note. Values demonstrate mean scores across the vignettes. Scores ranged from 1 (not at all 
ok) to 5 (very ok). Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Number of Moral and Social Conventional Reasons Used to Rate All Vignettes 
 Social 
Conventional 
   Moral    
 Child  Teacher  Child  Teacher  
 Peer School Peer School Peer School Peer School 







































































Note. Scores are for the number of times each reason was used, which could range from 0 to 
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Figure 1. Ratings of exclusion by principals. Values demonstrate mean scores across the 
principal vignettes. Scores ranged from 1 (not at all ok) to 5 (very ok). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
